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COMMENTS I
The Cry of a Child Left Unanswered:
Pennsylvania's Treatment of Battered
Children Who Kill Their Parents
A gentle lamb has rhetoric to plead,
And when she sees the butcher's knife decreed,
Her voice entreats him not to make her bleed.
Dr. William King-Mully of Mountown, Line 52'
I. Introduction
Reports of child abuse date from the 1600s,2 but infanticide was
used by many earlier civilizations as a means of population control.
3
Modem child abuse statistics are staggering: in Pennsylvania alone, over
20,000 children were reported abused in 1985,' and nearly three million
cases of child abuse are reported in the United States each year.5 In
spite of these figures, Pennsylvania remains reluctant to admit evidence
of the battered child syndrome as a defense to parricide.6 The state fails
to see that permitting this defense would allow justice and equal
1. JOHN C. GROCOTr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 215 (London, George Routledge & Sons, Lmtd.
6th ed. n.d.).
2. Karla 0. Boresi, Comment, Syndrome Testimony in Child Abuse Prosecutions: The Wave
of the Future?, 8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 207, 207 n.1 (1989).
3. SANDERS J. BREINER, M.D., SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS: CHILD ABUSE THROUGH THE
AGES AND TODAY 7 (1990) (citing L. WILLIAMSON, INFANTICIDE (1971)).
4. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S FAMILY VIOLENCE TASK FORCE, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 5
(1987) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
5. Scared Silent (ABC television broadcast Sept. 6, 1992, hosted by Oprah Winfrey). Reports
of child deaths from abuse and neglect jumped 23% nationwide between 1985 and 1986. PAUL A.
MONES, WHEN A CHILD KILLS-ABUSED CHILDREN WHO KILL THEIR PARENTS 322 (1991).
6. See infra notes 60-86 and surrounding text. Parricide is the act of killing a parent or
someone who stands in a similar relationship to the murderer. WEBSTER'S NEW UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 1305 (Jean L. McKechnie ed., 1983).
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protection for children. The defense permits evidence to be presented
regarding psychological effects of child abuse.7 When the horrors of
abuse finally become too much for a child to face, the child may kill his
abuser.
8
This Comment will focus on child abuse, the battered child
syndrome and the likelihood that Pennsylvania will accept the battered
child syndrome as a defense to parricide. Part II of this Comment defines
the battered child syndrome and compares the medical and legal
perspectives on child abuse. Part III discusses the legal requirements for
asserting a self-defense claim in Pennsylvania, the challenges of
defending a parricide case, and the resulting need for expert testimony on
battered child syndrome in such cases. Part IV examines the
admissibility of battered child syndrome and battered woman syndrome
evidence in Pennsylvania and the state's potential acceptance of a battered
child syndrome defense. Part V evaluates the emerging attitude toward
battered children who kill their abusers, and Part VI refutes common
objections to the admissibility of syndrome testimony. Finally, this
Comment concludes that there is a need for expert testimony when
attempting to prove that a battered child killed his abuser in self-defense.
II. Defining Child Abuse and the Battered Child Syndrome
A. The Battered Child Syndrome: A Medical Perspective on Child
Abuse
The battered child syndrome was first described in a medical journal
by C. Henry Kempe over thirty years ago. 9 Kempe studied 302 cases
from 71 hospitals nationwide and discovered several characteristics shared
by victims of what he called the "battered child syndrome."'t These
characteristics include "multiple injuries in various stages of healing, ...
frequently coupled with poor hygiene and malnutrition, but peculiarly
identified by the marked discrepancies between the clinical or physical
findings and the historical data provided by the parents.""t In creating
the term "battered child syndrome,"' 2  Kempe wanted to increase
7. See infra notes 55-59 and surrounding text.
8. MONES, supra note 5, at 62.
9. Kempe, et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17 (1962).
10. Id. at 17.
11. Allan H. McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family, 50 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 18 (1965) (showing how to identify a battered child and suggesting ways to remedy the
abuse).
12. A "syndrome" refers to "[t]he aggregate of signs and symptoms associated with any morbid
process and constituting the picture of the disease." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1522
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physician awareness of the link between child abuse and a specific set of
injuries, but maintain that such injuries were not accidental.13
Since Kempe's research, battered children have been studied by
pediatricians, psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists and social
workers. 14  While Kempe's definition of the battered child syndrome
focused on the physical manifestations of child abuse as described in
medical reports, subsequent research has centered on the. psychological
aspects of child abuse. 15 As a result, there is a greater awareness of the
ways in which abuse affects children. Typical psychological symptoms
of child abuse include disruptiveness,16 isolation, depression, low self-
esteem and learned helplessness. 7 In addition, abused children have
also developed a keen awareness for when they are about to be abused."
Recognizing the psychological aspects of child abuse, some experts
propose that the battered child syndrome encompass a psychological as
well as physical diagnosis. 9
B. A Legal Perspective on Child Abuse
The legal treatment of child abuse victims reflects a narrow definition
of abuse. Society's concern for abused children is limited to the type of
abuse that puts a child in immediate, life threatening physical danger.20
This definition of abuse fails to recognize the other forms of abuse which
are not as physically obvious. For example, in addition to physical
abuse,21 children may be neglected or receive emotional, verbal or
(William R. Hensyl ed., 25th ed. 1990).
13. Steven R. Hicks, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Psychology of the Battered Child,
11 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 103, 109 (1987).
14. NEIL FRUDE, PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES T CHILD ABUSE 5 (1981). See generally
Hicks, supra note 13.
15. FRUDE, supra note 14, at 5.
16. MICHAEL S. MACPHERSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ABUSE 270 (1984).
17. See generally, MONES, supra note 5. Other signs of child abuse include bruises and welts,
frequent absences at school, undernourishment, withdrawal, an unkempt appearance and the need for
medical attention. MACPHERSON, supra note 6, at 269-70.
18. MONES, supra note 5, at 63. This awareness is known as "hypervigilance." See also infra
note 57 and accompanying text.
19. Hicks, supra note 13, at 111.
20. MACPHERSON, supra note 16, at vii.
21. The methods of physical abuse vary, but by far the most common are beatings with various
instruments such as fists, chair legs, hair brushes and fan belts. McCoid, supra note 11, at 15
(quoting VINCENT DEFRANCIS, CHILD ABUSE-PREVIEW OF A NATIONWIDE SURVEY 5-7 (1963)).
Children have also been burned in open flames, with lighted cigarettes, electric irons or scalding
liquids. Id. Additionally, the brutality includes stabbings, shootings, electric shocks and drownings.
Id.
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sexual abuse.22 Most abused children experience multiple forms of
abuse.23
The classification of a child's sexual assault by a relative as "sexual
abuse" rather than "rape" is additional evidence of society's ignorance of
the plight of children. This designation appears to be due to society's
misperception that sexual abuse by a relative is not forcefully imposed.24
However, most sexually abused children are forced to have sex with their
abuser,' although the force used may be more psychological than
physical.26 Because the perceived brutality of "sexual abuse" is less
than that of "rape," this classification of assault results in less stringent
penalties.27
Pennsylvania's protection of abused children is similarly insufficient.
For example, Pennsylvania defines child abuse merely as "serious
physical or mental injury."28 In addition, abused children are usually
not removed from the home unless severe harm is demonstrated, and even
then it is a long and difficult process.29 Pennsylvania's criteria for child
abuse also fails to address actions or omissions that threaten the child's
health or safety. It should therefore be no surprise that some abused
children who lack adequate legal or other protection react violently by
killing their abusers. To these children, murder is their only means of
self-defense.
22. MACPHERSON, supra note 16, at 2. The sexual exploitation of children is one of the most
under-reported crimes in the country. U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CHILD
MOLESTATION 201 (1984). Even when child molestation is reported, the abusers may receive
inadequate punishment. See id. For example, the same court that sentenced a man to four years in
prison for stealing a television set, 400 pennies, 2 bars of soap, a bottle of aftershave lotion, and a
handbag full of hair curlers sentenced another man on the same day to only one year in jail for
molesting three girls in a licensed day care home operated by his wife. Id.
23. MACPHERSON, supra note 16, at 3.
24. MONES, supra note 5, at 142.
25. Id. at 142-43.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303 (1991). Child abuse is defined in the Child Protective
Services Law as:
Serious physical or mental injury which is not explained by the available medical history
as being accidental, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or serious physical neglect of a child
under 18 years of age if the injury, abuse or neglect has been caused by the acts or
omissions of the child's parents or by a person responsible for the child's welfare, or any
individual residing in the same home as the child, or a paramour of the child's parents.
Id
29. MACPHERSON, supra note 16, at 5.
30. Although Pennsylvania punishes abusive parents whose acts or omissions result in actual
injury to their children, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303 (1991), the state does not punish any
parental acts or omissions that threaten a child's welfare.
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III. The Self-Defense Theory and the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony Concerning Battered Child Syndrome
A. Self-Defense Claims in Pennsylvania
Under Pennsylvania law, a defendant establishes a self-defense claim
if he proves that he reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury and that it was necessary to use deadly
force against the victim to prevent such harm.31 In determining
subjective or actual fear, the court will consider evidence of the victim's
past behavior if such behavior was known to the defendant and could
have added to his fear.32 In addition, psychiatric testimony regarding
the accused's state of mind is permitted to establish a subjective belief of
imminent danger.3 3 A self-defense claim will be rejected, however, if
the defendant provoked the altercation or violated any duty to retreat. 4
Since self-defense includes an objective component, the court will
typically instruct the jury to analyze whether a reasonable person would
have felt the need to use self-defense under the same circumstances.35
Because reasonableness and culpability can best be determined by
analyzing the defendant's attributes and the particular situation he faced,
the jury should be instructed to consider the defendant's individual
circumstances.36 Thus, the trier of fact should consider evidence of the
comparative size, weight, and strength of the defendant and the victim
and, whether the defendant suffered from some physical handicap or
injury.37 Courts have generally found that if the attacker was unarmed,
the use of deadly force is more difficult to justify.
3
31. Commonwealth v. Samuel, 590 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 1991). See also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 505(a) (1983). "'The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor
believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose or protecting himself against the
use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion." lId
32. E.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 394 A.2d 968, 970 (Pa. 1978); Commonwealth v. Russell,
473 A.2d 1383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
33. Commonwealth v. Light, 326 A.2d 288, 292 (Pa. 1974).
34. Samuel, 590 A.2d at 1247-48. See also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b) (1983). In
addition, the use of force is not justifiable when used to resist an arrest or resist the force of one
defending his property under a known claim of right. Id.
35. Commonwealth v. Helm, 402 A.2d 500, 504 (Pa. 1979).
36. Id. at 504-505.
37. Smith v. United States, 161 U.S. 85, 88 (1896); See also, Kit Kinports, Defending Battered
Women's Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393 (1988) (contending that battered women who kill
their husbands can legitimately invoke the standard self-defense claim).
38. Commonwealth v. Jones, 332 A.2d 464, 466 (Pa. Super Ct. 1974). However, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a wife's subjective belief of imminent danger was
reasonable where her husband was unarmed. Commonwealth v. Watson, 431 A.2d 949 (Pa. 1981).
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To further assess the reasonableness of the defendant's actions, the
jury may examine evidence of the victim's prior acts or threats of
violence.39 Pennsylvania admits such character evidence because it may
corroborate the defendant's self-defense claim.4° "It is only when the
jury understands how the defendant perceives the alleged danger are they
[sic] able to make a rational judgment about the defendant's actions.
41
B. Parricide: Challenges to the Defense and the Need for Expert
Testimony on Battered Child Syndrome
In 1989, 21,500 homicides were committed in the United States, 344
of which were parricides.42  A parricide typically presents the
prosecution with a case of first degree murder.43 These cases involve
significant challenges for the defense. First, the defense must overcome
the unspoken expectation that a child should always treat his parents with
love, regardless of his suffering." Second, because there is usually
overkill, such as multiple bullet or stab wounds, it is difficult to prove
that there was no premeditation or that such extreme behavior was due
to fear of retaliation.45
Third, because the act of killing one's parent is seen as too brutal to
justify the leniency of the juvenile system,46 parricides are rarely tried
in juvenile court.47 In Pennsylvania, the legislature has expressly
39. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
40. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 394 A.2d 968, 970 (Pa. 1978). Evidence of the victim's violent
nature can also be presented to prove that the victim was in fact the aggressor. Commonwealth v.
Clemmons, 479 A.2d 955 (Pa. 1984). Courts refuse to admit character evidence when the defense
is provocation. Commonwealth v. Rivers, 557 A.2d 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 567 A.2d
652 (Pa. 1989).
41. Commonwealth v. Dillon, 598 A.2d 963, 971 (Pa. 1991) (Cappy, J., concurring).
42. MONES, supra note 5, at 25. The typical parent who died at the hands of his child was an
abuser who was addicted to controlling the child and the pleasure that accompanied the exercise of
such control. Id. at 13-14.
43. Id.
44. A belief that children must respect and obey their parents dates at least to biblical times.
The fourth commandment tells a child to "honor thy father and thy mother." Exodus 20:12 (King
James). The Bible even recommends death for a child who disobeys his parents: "And he that
smiteth his father, or his mother, shall be surely put to death." Id. at 21:15.
45. MONES, supra note 5, at 106.
46. See id. at 89. Additionally, most parricides seem to be committed by older teenaged
children, thus justifying trial as an adult. See generally, MONES, supra note 5; GREGGORY W.
MORRIS, THE KIDS NEXT DOOR: SONS AND DAUGHTERS WHO KILL THEIR PARENTS (1985).
However, despite their chronological age, abused children have an emotional age of only one to three
years. MACPHERSON, supra note 16, at 22. "The abused child, overwhelmed and unable to cope
with trauma of abuse, regresses backwards." Id.
47. MONES, supra note 5, at 89. On November 18, 1992, another battered child, Billie Joe
Powell, fell victim to a judge's ruling that she be tried as an adult. Town Supports Teen Who Killed
Abusive Dad, EVENING SENTINEL (Carlisle, Pa.), Nov. 21, 1992, at Al. Billie Joe had been sexually,
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excluded murder allegations from the original jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. 48  Although a parricide case may be transferred to juvenile court
at the discretion of the common pleas court,49 the defendant child bears
the burden of proving that his case does not belong in adult court.5"
This is accomplished by demonstrating an amenability to programs of
rehabilitation, supervision and care that are provided by the juvenile court
system.5 Unfortunately, the brutality of parricides and the social stigma
attached to them make transfer to a juvenile court very unlikely.52 The
defendant's lack of repentance is an additional stumbling block to
transfer: in most parricides by abused children, the child believed that
murder was necessary to ensure his survival.53
Finally, judicial rejection of the psychological realities of child abuse
has become a major obstacle to the defense of battered children who
murder their parents.' Although battered child syndrome research has
identified the psychological effects of child abuse, Pennsylvania continues
physically, and emotionally abused by her father. Id. Following a night of this abuse, Billie Joe
fired a single-shot .22 caliber rifle into her father's back. d Although she showed little remorse,
her hometown of Cement, Oklahoma rallied around her based on an awareness of the rumors of her
abuse and on a belief that "frontier justice" was achieved. Jana Mazanec, Murderer or Victim?, USA
TODAY, Nov. 12, 1992, at 2A. Although the prosecutor recommended that the case be handled in
the juvenile system, the judge ruled that she be tried as an adult. Perhaps this case indicates a
heightened awareness of the stigma of child abuse and the court system's ignorance of the plight of
battered children.
48. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (Supp. 1993). See also Commonwealth v. Romeri, 470
A.2d 498, 505 (Pa. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 (1984); Commonwealth v. Pyle, 342 A.2d 101,
106 (Pa. 1975).
49. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6322(a) (Supp. 1993). See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zoller,
498 A.2d 436, 439 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (denying transfer due to juvenile's violent episodes and
absence of guarantee that he would respond sufficiently to treatment during juvenile court's
authority).
50. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6322(a) (Supp. 1993). Delinquency cases that do not involve
murder may be transferred to adult court, but the Commonwealth has the burden of proving that the
youthful offender does not belong in the juvenile justice system. Pyle, 342 A.2d at 106 n. 11; see
also Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602 A.2d 1308, 1311 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Brown, 480
A.2d 1171, 1174 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
51. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6322(a) (Supp. 1993). The relevant factors to be considered
in determining whether a child is amenable to the juvenile system's rehabilitation, supervision and
care include: age; mental capacity; maturity; degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the child;
previous record; nature and extent of any prior delinquent history, including the success or failure
of any previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the child; whether the child can be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction; probation or institutional
reports; and the nature and circumstances of the acts for which the transfer is sought. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A) (1982). See also Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602 A.2d at 1312
(holding that behavior disorder may be considered in determining amenability to juvenile justice
system).
52. See generally MONES, supra note 5.
53., MONES, supra note 5, at 312.
54. See generally, MONES, supra note 5.
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to equate battered child syndrome solely with a medical diagnosis of
physical abuse.5' However, information regarding the psychological
effects of abuse is necessary to defend a battered child who murdered his
parent. Expert testimony on the battered child syndrome can
demonstrate that the abused child's actions were immediately necessary,
and therefore reasonable, by explaining how abuse sharpens the child's
perception of imminent danger. 56  Abused children develop a "finely
tuned antenna for impending violence" based on the experience of
previous incidents and the dangers associated with them. Expert
testimony that abused children develop an instinctual awareness of the
threat of death or serious bodily harm can help establish a successful
theory of self-defense.
Additionally, expert testimony can educate the judge and jury about
the horrors of child abuse, including the disbelief of adults to whom
children have complained of abuse.58  The expert can expose the effect
that violence has on a child and explain why the child did not run away
or try to get help.59
IV. The Battered Child Syndrome as a Defense in Pennsylvania
A. Admissibility of Battered Child Syndrome Testimony in
Pennsylvania Child Abuse Prosecutions
In those jurisdictions that have considered the issue, battered child
syndrome testimony is admissible in child abuse prosecutions to show
that the victim's injuries were not accidental. 60 In Commonwealth v.
55. Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 835-36 (Pa. 1992). The Supreme Court of
Washington expressly recognized in Janes, however, that the battered child syndrome describes both
the psychological and physical effects of child abuse. State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 501 (Wash.
1993).
56. MONES, supra note 5, at 62. The plight of battered children, who "[iun the dark moments
of their aloneness... perceive the imminence of danger... [and] undertake to assert their right of
self-defense" must not be ignored by the court system and its duty to do justice. Jahnke v. State, 682
P.2d 991, 1012 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting).
57. MONES, supra note 5, at 62. See also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
58. HICKS, supra note 13, at 104. See also State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 503 (Wash. 1993).
59. Abused children are often threatened with more abuse if they choose to run away or to
report the violence. MONES, supra note 5, at 37. Sometimes the child will not leave due to threats
that a sibling or the other parent will be abused or killed. Id. Abuse children become extremely
psychologically attached to their abusive parents. Id. at 34. Their dependency on the abuser,
complicated by confusion and guilt after an attack, results in a reluctance to report any abuse. Id
60. State v. Wilkerson, 247 S.E.2d 905, 912 (N.C. 1978). See also, People v. Jackson, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 919, 922 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (holding physician testimony on presence of battered child
syndrome did not invade province of jury); State v. Loss, 204 N.W.2d 404, 408-409 (Minn. 1973)
(allowing physician testimony that cause of child's death was "brain injury secondary to battered
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Rodgers,1 the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the admissibility
of expert testimony on battered child syndrome in the prosecution of two
parents for the death of their toddler.62 At trial, a qualified expert
witness testified that the child suffered from the syndrome.63 In
addition, based upon his physical examination of the child, the expert
offered his opinion regarding the means by which the defendant parents
had inflicted various injuries on their daughter. 64 The expert neither
offered an opinion as to the culpability of the defendants nor testified to
any behavioral patterns which could have categorized the child as
abused. 65 Rather, the expert's testimony simply revealed that the child
was not accidentally injured.66 The court held that such testimony is
admissible in the prosecution of a child abuser when given by properly
qualified experts and relevant to the particular factual circumstances of
the case.67
B. Admissibility of Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome Testimony in
Pennsylvania
When syndrome testimony is offered to show the psychological
characteristics and behavior patterns of abused children, Pennsylvania is
not as responsive. For example, Pennsylvania has refused to admit expert
testimony concerning the "child sexual abuse syndrome," which describes
the typical behavior patterns exhibited by sexually abused children.
6
8
The Pennsylvania supreme court in Commonwealth v. Dunkle69 held
such testimony to be prejudicial because the syndrome was not
child syndrome"); People v. Henson, 304 N.E.2d 358, 363-64 (N.Y. 1973) (holding expert testimony
on battered child syndrome relevant in determining whether the child's injuries were accidental); State
v. Best, 232 N.W.2d 447, 458 (S.D. 1975) (stating "we have found no case in which expert medical
testimony on the 'battered child syndrome' was rejected.").
61. 528 A.2d 610 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), appeal denied, 542 A.2d 1368 (Pa. 1988).
62. Id. at 613. Although in 1973 the Pennsylvania supreme court permitted a jury to evaluate
an expert witness' opinion that the injuries in a child abuse case were not accidental, the court did
not explicitly discuss the battered child syndrome. Commonwealth v. Paquette, 301 A.2d 837 (Pa.
1973).
63. Rodgers, 528 A.2d at 613.
64. See id. at 614.
65. See id. at 615.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 614. In Pennsylvania, relevancy is found when the evidence has probative value and
makes the existence of a fact material to a case. Commonwealth v. Shain, 471 A.2d 1246, 1249 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984). A piece of evidence is of essential evidentiary value if the need for it outweighs
the likelihood that it will inflame the passions of the jury. Commonwealth v. Petrakovich, 329 A.2d
844, 849 (Pa. 1974). See also, Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 454 A.2d 547, 549 (Pa. 1982);
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 380 A.2d 747, 750 (Pa. 1977).
68. Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992).
69. Id.
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"sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belong[ed].07  The court also held that the
evidence was irrelevant.71 Citing to numerous scholarly works on the
subject, the court found no typical behavior pattern or personality profile
for sexually abused children.72 The court found that although sexually
abused children may exhibit the behavior patterns identified by the expert
witness, 73 those patterns were just as common to children of divorced
parents74 and to psychologically abused children.
75
The Dunkle court compared expert testimony on child sexual abuse
syndrome with such testimony on the battered child syndrome and
concluded that the latter evidence was unique to physically abused
children and lacked the generality of testimony characteristic of child
sexual abuse syndrome. 76  The court held that expert testimony
regarding behavior patterns exhibited by sexually abused children "merely
attempts ... to suggest that the victim was, in fact, exhibiting symptoms
of sexual abuse 7 7  and that this "attempt" does not raise the evidence
to the level of probative value necessary for admissibility.78 The court
contended that an introduction of such testimony was erroneous in light
of the fact that the proposed behaviors of sexually abused children lacked
uniformity and support in the scientific community.79 The Dunkle court
70. Id. at 832, (citing Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d 170, 172 (Pa. 1981) (quoting
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923))).
71. Id. at 834. The evidence was not relevant because it failed to "render[] the desired
inferences more probable than it [sic] would be without evidence." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v.
Stewart, 336 A.2d 282, 284 (Pa. 1975)). Relevant evidence must somehow advance the factfinder's
inquiry. Commonwealth v. Walzack, 360 A.2d 914, 918 (Pa. 1976). See also MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 185 at 544-45 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1983).
72. Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. 1992). But see, Commonwealth v.
Kacsmar, 617 A.2d 725 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (permitting psychiatric evidence regarding lack of self-
esteem and change in abuse patterns).
73. The expert had testified that sexually abused children exhibit characteristics of low self-
esteem, withdrawal, disassociation, falling grades, and lack of concentration on school work. 603
A.2d at 833.
74. Id. (citing JUDITH S. WALTERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How
CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE wITH DIVORCE (1980)).
75. Id. (citing JAMES GABARUNO ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGICALLY BATTERED CHILD 69 (1986)).
The court noted that the following characteristics have been identified as exemplary of
psychologically maltreated children: inferiority, low self-esteem, anxiety, aggressiveness, and
inadequate social behavior. Id. at 833 n.7 (citing JAMES GABARINO ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGICALLY
ABUSED CHILD 69 (1986)).
76. Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 836 (Pa. 1992). The court noted that it had not
yet expressed an opinion on the subject of the battered child syndrome because it had not yet come
before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Id. at 836 n.17.
77. Id. at 834.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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further held that expert testimony is unnecessary in the prosecution of a
child abuser to explain why sexually abused children may forget details
of the abuse, delay reporting assaults and fail to provide authorities with
complete details of the abuse.8° The court believed that this information
is "well within the range of common experience. 8
Ironically, the court supported its position by relying upon the
research of experts, yet it inexplicably instructed that such information is
within a jury's common knowledge. However, unless a juror has
experienced some form of child abuse or personally knows someone who
has been abused, information concerning the behavior patterns of abused
children is unlikely to be within that juror's common knowledge.82 If
behavioral patterns resulting from sexual abuse are common knowledge,
it is difficult to understand why sexual abuse by one parent often goes
unnoticed by the other parent. 3
Expert testimony is admitted in Pennsylvania to aid a jury when the
subject matter is related to a science, skill or occupation beyond the
knowledge and experience of an average person." The psychology of
intra-familial abuse is a science beyond ordinary lay experience. As
recognized by the Dunkle dissent, to assert that such matters are
universally understood is to declare the field of psychology
insignificant. 85  Additionally, although sexually abused children may
share traits common to other abused children, no one has disputed that
any of these patterns have been found in sexually abused children. 6
C. Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony in
Pennsylvania
Closely analogous to the battered child syndrome is the battered
woman syndrome, which is often presented as a defense by women who
kill their abusers.87 This syndrome describes an identifiable group of
80. Id. at 836-37.
81. Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 837 (Pa. 1992).
82. See idL at 843 n.3 (Larsen, J., dissenting); State v. Janes, 822 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Wash. App.
1992).
83. See generally MONES, supra note 5; MACPHERSON, supra note 16; McCoid, supra note 11.
84. Commonwealth v. Duffey, 548 A.2d 1178 (Pa. 1988).
85. Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 840 (McDermott, J., dissenting). Justice McDermott wrote:
I believe the majority is ascribing to the average juror incredible sophistication regarding
the effect of sexual abuse on the workings of a young mind .... [This] basically
trivializes an entire field of child psychology by implying that everybody already knows
these facts as surely as they know that apples fall down.
Id. at 839-40.
86. Id. at 843 n.4 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
87. See generally CHARLES P. EwiNG, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-
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symptoms that characterize the behavior and state of mind of women who
have experienced long-term spousal abuse.88
In Commonwealth v. Stonehouse,"9  the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania overturned a battered woman's murder conviction because
her defense counsel failed to request an instruction requiring the jury to
consider the cumulative effects of long-term physical and psychological
abuse when assessing the reasonableness of the defendant's self-defense
claim.90 In a portion of the majority opinion embraced by only two
other justices, Justice Larsen found that the battered woman syndrome
was not within the ordinary training, knowledge, intelligence and
experience of jurors.9 He concluded that expert testimony was
therefore necessary to provide a proper basis for the jury to evaluate the
reasonableness of the defendant's use of deadly force. 92 The plurality
DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1987); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN (1979);
Lenore E. Walker, et al., Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L. REV. 1 (1982); David
L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome & Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent,
72 VA. L. REv. 619 (1986). The admissibility of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome and
premenstrual stress syndrome has also been questioned. See, e.g., Patricia A. Frazier & Eugene
Borgida, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of Case Law and Psychological Research, 16 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 293 (1992); Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape
Trauma Syndrome and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REv. 395
(1985); Mark P. Press, Note, Premenstrual Stress Syndrome as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 1983
DuKE L.J. 176 (1983); Note, Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility
of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 VA. L. REv. 1657
(1984).
88. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KiLL 13 (1987). When a woman does kill
her abuser, it is typically unplanned and occurs in the midst of an attack against her, during a
warning phase when it became apparent that the attack was inevitable or during an escape attempt.
Id. at 22.
89. 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989) (plurality opinion).
90. Id. at 781. For three years, the defendant, Carol Stonehouse, experienced physical and
psychological abuse at the hands of William Welsh, a man she dated for approximately one year.
Id. at 774. "The events culminating in Welsh's death are so bizarre that one would be tempted to
dismiss them as the stuff of pulp fiction were it not for the collaboration of disinterested witnesses
.. .. "Id. Welsh left flowers at the defendant's door for her funeral, stole her car multiple times,
deflated her tires several times a week, and followed her everywhere. Id. at 774-76. Welsh
vandalized the defendant's apartment on multiple occasions by slashing and urinating on her bed;
cutting up her clothes; smearing food, cleaning products and lotions on her floors and walls; filling
her dresser drawers with water; and soaking her clothes in beet juice. Id. at 775, 776. Welsh
frequently broke into the defendant's apartment while she was asleep and threatened to kill her. Id.
at 776. On the night of his death, Welsh broke into the defendant's apartment, held her at gunpoint
and threatened to kill her. Id. at 779. Stonehouse shot Welsh when she next saw him pointing his
gun at her. Id. Stonehouse was convicted of third degree murder and sentenced to seven to fourteen
years imprisonment. 555 A.2d at 780. She appealed her conviction, claiming ineffective assistance
of trial counsel. Id.
91. Id. at 782-83.
92. Id. See also Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F. Supp. 451, 456 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome to be distinctly related to psychological evaluations beyond
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believed that such testimony was necessary to counter the myths
surrounding abused women93 and allow the defendant's actions to be
considered in light of how a reasonably prudent battered woman would
have reacted.94
Although four of the seven justices expressly declined to embrace
the battered woman syndrome as a separate theory of self-defense,9" this
was largely because the appellant stated that the battered woman
syndrome was not involved in her case.96 The concurring and dissenting
justices appear willing to address the issue in the future, but only after the
issue is properly raised on appeal.97
D. An Evaluation of Pennsylvania's Probable Response to the
Battered Child Syndrome Defense
Given Pennsylvania's failure in child abuse prosecutions to recognize
behavior patterns exhibited by sexually abused children, it is doubtful that
similar evidence regarding physically abused children will be permitted
when an abused child is a criminal defendant. Although Stonehouse may
offer hope for the acceptance of a battered child syndrome defense, the
Dunkle decision strongly indicates otherwise. Pennsylvania's
misperception that the average juror is aware of the attributes a battered
child displays98 and its position that the proffered psychological
testimony on abused children is not scientifically accepted" prevents
admission of relevant expert testimony at trial. This presents an obstacle
difficult for an abused child's defense attorney to surmount.
The repercussions of long-term abuse on a child's identity are
beyond the average juror's understanding."°  If the prosecution
questions validity and accuracy of such expert psychological testimony,
it should be permitted an opportunity to refute such evidence and thereby
comprehension of average layman).
93. Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772, 783-84 (Pa. 1989).
94. Id. at 784. This is the first time that the battered woman syndrome appears to have been
recognized as a valid defense in Pennsylvania.
95. Justice Zappala wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Flaherty joined, stating that
they declined to reach the battered woman syndrome self-defense issue. Id. at 785. In his dissenting
opinion, Chief Justice Nix, joined by Justice McDermott, also expressly declined to reach the battered
woman syndrome self-defense issue. Id at 785-86.
96. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d at 785. The plurality stated that although the appellant's counsel did
not address the issue in terms of the battered woman syndrome, such an issue was addressed by amici
and would therefore be considered. Id. at 774.
97. Id. at 785, 786.
98. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
100. See State v. Janes, 822 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Wash. App. 1992), review granted, 832 P.2d 488
(Wash. 1992).
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give the jury a chance to weigh the evidence. Without the presentation
of expert testimony, however, the battered child appears destined for
conviction.'10 Thus, Pennsylvania should re-evaluate its conservative
view and follow the emerging acceptance of such testimony.
V. A Changing Attitude Toward Children Who Kill Their Parents
Public anger at abusive parents" may be responsible for
legislative and judicial sympathy toward children who commit parricide.
For example, seventeen-year-old Donna Marie Wisener was acquitted
under a new Texas law that permits a person accused of killing a family
member to introduce evidence of prior abuse, as well as expert testimony
on the psychologies of victims of battering. 3 Since she was two or
three years old, she had been physically and sexually abused by her
father. "° Her father had once handcuffed her to a chair for his
amusement, and beat her unconscious when she had brought home an
unsatisfactory report card. 5 Additionally, she was emotionally abused,
especially because she was aware that her mother was also being
abused.'06 Donna shot her father in the head, hip, hand, back, and
side.'0 7
Texas is one of six states that permits a battering defense by law,
although it is the only state that does not limit its application to
women. 08 The state permits psychological testimony and evidence of
prior abuse to prove that the defendant's fear was reasonable. This law
reflects the evolving attitude of compassion and understanding toward
children who murder their parents. 1°9
The Washington Court of Appeals took a significant step in
recognizing the rights of abused children when it overturned the second
degree murder conviction of a boy who killed his abusive stepfather."
0
101. See generally supra notes 42-59 and surrounding text.
102. See, e.g., supra note 47.
103. David Margolick, When Child Kills Parent, It's Sometimes to Survive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1992, at Al.
104. Mark Hansen, Battered Child's Defense: Youths Who Killed Relatives Offer Evidence of
Abuse With Mixed Results, May 1992 A.B.A. J. at 28.
105. Margolick, supra note 103.
106. Hansen, supra note 104. Abusers traditionally mistreat others to gain a sense of power and
control over them. MONIEs, supra note 5, at 13-14. If the child is sexually abused by a family
member, it is usually not because the abuser has a true sexual preference for children, but because
the abuser is overcome by low self-esteem and poor coping skills and sees the child as a sexual
substitute for the preferred peer partner. TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 5.
107. Margolick, supra note 103, at Al.
108. Hansen, supra note 104.
109. Id.
110. State v. Janes, 822 P.2d 1238 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), affd and remanded, 850 P.2d 495
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For ten years, Andrew Janes's stepfather frequently hit him over the head
with firewood, beat him unconscious, and threatened to kill him."'
Although his stepfather's actions were reported to Child Protective
Services on three occasions, the Service did not follow up on those
reports.Y2  After being threatened by his stepfather the night before,
Andy left for school the following morning only to return home after two
classes to wait, with shotgun in hand, for his stepfather to arrive
home.'1 3 Andy shot his stepfather as the man entered his home, and as
a result of two gunshot wounds to the head, his stepfather died." 4
Andy's justification for the killing was that he acted in self-defense
because "he perceived himself to be in imminent danger of serious bodily
harm as a consequence of a condition analogous to 'battered woman
syndrome,' stemming from the ten years of abuse he had suffered
.... , The trial court refused to permit testimony regarding self-
defense; however, it did allow experts to testify on the defense of
diminished capacity."
The Washington Court of Appeals was the first appellate court in the
United States to hold specifically that the battered child syndrome applies
to cases where an abused child kills a parent."7 The court held that the
trial judge erroneously refused to admit testimony regarding battered child
syndrome after failing to acknowledge its well-developed scientific
basis."8 The court noted that since Washington courts have admitted
(Wash. 1993).
111. D. M. Osborne, In the News: Solo Wins Right to Battered Child Defense, AM. LAWYER,
April 1992, at 119.
112. State v. Janes, 822 P.2d at 1240. On at least two of the three occasions, Mrs. Janes or Andy
requested that Protective Services not follow up on their initial call because they feared that they
would be abused even further. 141 Many times the abused person is threatened if they tell someone
of the abuse. See generally BROWNE, supra note 88; MACPHERSON, supra note 16. Because the
abuser can only continue battering if his victim is silenced, the abused are frequently threatened with
additional violence should they report the abuse. See generally BROWNE, supra note 88;
MACPHERSON, supra note 16.
113. 822 P.2d at 1240.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1241.
116. kd Two expert witnesses testified that Andy suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder.
Id. As a result, the jury was instructed that it could consider a mental illness or disorder to negate
an element of a crime that required a particular mental state. ld
117. Hansen, supra note 104, at 28. This statement was made by Paul Mones, the only lawyer
in the country who specializes in defending children who kill their parents. ld. Mones was co-
counsel for Donna Marie Wisener and a defense consultant in the Janes case. Id. For more
information about his work and how to develop a proper defense in parricide cases, see generally
MONES, supra note 5.
118. Janes, 822 P.2d at 1242. In analyzing whether expert testimony concerning the battered
child syndrome is admissible to establish a claim of self-defense, the court considered whether
scientific understanding of the battered child syndrome was sufficiently developed to be generally
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expert testimony on battered woman syndrome to explain a woman's
perception, the same allowance should be made for battered child
syndrome testimony, especially since "children are both objectively and
subjectively more vulnerable to the effects of violence than are
adults." 119  The rationale for admitting battered child syndrome
testimony was found to be "as compelling, if not more so, when applied
to children.' 2
The court also felt that without expert testimony on battered child
syndrome, the jury would not be able to adequately evaluate the
reasonableness of Andy's perception that he was in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily harm at the time of the homicide.1 2  The
impact of long-term abuse was determined to be beyond the average
juror's comprehension." Without expert testimony to put the child's
perceptions into context, the jury would not be capable of making a fair
evaluation of the child's feeling of imminency.
1 23
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court held that expert
testimony regarding battered child syndrome is generally admissible in
appropriate cases to aid in the proof of self- defense.124 The court
agreed with the Court of Appeals that the underlying principles of the
syndrome are helpful to the trier of fact in understanding a "little-known
psychological problem."' The court maintained that battered child
syndrome was of considerable assistance in evaluating the reasonableness
of Andy's belief that his life was in imminent danger and was necessary
to properly understand Andy's subjective perceptions.
126
admissible and whether expert testimony would have been helpful to the jury. Id. See also State v.
Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984).
119. Janes, 822 P.2d at 1243, (citing State v. Fisher, 739 P.2d 683 (Wash. 1987) (describing
children as being among the most vulnerable members of society); State v. Grewe, 813 P.2d 1238
(Wash. 1991) (stating that one aspect of children's extreme vulnerability is their tendency to trust)).
See generally MACPHERSON, supra note 16 (presenting a theoretical framework to help explain child
abuse).
120. Janes, 822 P.2d at 1243. The court indicated that children lack the ability to support
themselves and the life experience necessary to put battering into perspective. Id.
121. Id. Washington's test for self-defense "requires a showing of (1) reasonable apprehension
of a design to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury, and (2) imminent danger of that
design being accomplished." Id. at 1241 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.050(1 1) (West
1988); State v. Negrin, 681 P.2d 1287 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)). To prove imminent danger, the
victim must honestly and reasonably believe that the aggressor intended to inflict future serious
bodily injury. Janes, 822 P.2d at 1241 (citing State v. Negrin, 681 P.2d 1287 (Wash. Ct. App.
1984)).
122. Janes, 822 P.2d at 1243.
123. Id
124. State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 503 (Wash. 1993).
125. Id.
126. Id at 505. The court remanded the case so that the trial court could reconsider its ruling
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Both the Wisener and Janes decisions represent a recognition of the
rights of battered children and the need for expert testimony in cases
where an abused child kills a parent. Pennsylvania should adopt this
emerging position on the admissibility of expert testimony and show
compassion for and comprehension of the plight of abused children.
VI. Responses to Common Objections on Admissibility of Expert
Testimony
Objections to the use of expert testimony to describe the
characteristics of different syndromes include: (1) that the evidence is
unfairly prejudicial; (2) that it represents an improper comment on the
credibility of a claimant and thus, invades the jury's province; (3) that
such evidence is not beyond the knowledge of an ordinary juror; and (4)
that it fails to pass the Frye test.'27 By examining these criticisms in
light of expert testimony concerning the battered child syndrome, it
appears that such objections are refutable and therefore, should not stand
in the way of admissibility in Pennsylvania.
First, expert testimony concerning the behavior patterns displayed by
abused children is not prejudicial. Prejudice does not mean "detrimental
to a party's case"," but rather, "an undue tendency to suggest a
decision on an improper basis."'29  In cases where an abused child
murders in self-defense, expert testimony relating to the characteristics of
abused children would not be suggestive of forming a decision on an
"improper basis". Rather, it would describe for the jury the sufferings of
an abused child and how this may affect the child's impression of
imminency. Because such testimony helps explain why a child might
murder a parent, its probative value outweighs any danger of unfair
prejudice. 13 Such testimony is necessary for the jury to receive an
denying the self-defense instruction because the record failed to indicate whether the trial court
considered the defense evidence in light of Andy's subjective knowledge and perceptions. Id. at 506.
The court also thought that the trial court may not have properly interpreted the term "imminence."
Id.
127. David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles & Other Mental Erotica: A New Approach to the
Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REv. 19, 69
(1987).
128. Daset Mining Corp. v. Industrial Fuels Corp., 473 A.2d 584, 588 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(citing Whistler Sportswear, Inc. v. Rullo, 433 A.2d 40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)).
129. 1d5 In Pennsylvania, the trial judge has broad discretion in admitting potentially misleading
and confusing evidence. See also Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affd, 503
F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974).
130. See Commonwealth v. Ulatoski, 371 A.2d 186, 191 n.1 1 (Pa. 1977); Daset Mining Corp.,
473 A.2d at 588 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). It seems that Pennsylvania courts adopt Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 in their analysis of admissibility of evidence. Daset Mining Co., 473 A.2d at 588.
Rule 403 requires the probative.value of the evidence to outweigh any prejudicial effects. FED. R.
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accurate picture of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the
homicide.
Second, expert testimony on the battered child syndrome would not
invade the province of the jury. Because such testimony is about abused
children in general and does not refer specifically to the defendant's
behavior, it does not impose on the jury's duty to assess credibility. The
function of the expert testimony is merely to assist the trier of fact in
evaluating the reasonableness of both the use of force and degree of force
used.131 Ultimately, the decision of whether the child was actually
battered and whether he or she reasonably believed that it was necessary
to kill for protective purposes remains with the jury. Furthermore, the
prosecution would be entitled to introduce any proper expert testimony
in rebuttal.
Third, this evidence remains beyond the understanding of the
average juror. 32 An average juror cannot imagine what an abused child
goes through on a daily basis, unless that juror was abused or personally
knows a child who has been abused. Lacking familiarity with such a
situation, a juror is not able to adequately analyze the child's self-defense
claims. Thus, expert testimony is a necessary aid, and not an
encumbrance, to the jury's duties. Expert testimony will not affect a
juror's interpretation of credibility as long as the expert refrains from
drawing distinctive conclusions about the culpability of the defendant.
Fourth, the Frye test is not the proper standard by which to judge the
admissibility of expert testimony. Under the Frye test, a determination
of admissibility is based on whether the scientific methods used in
developing the evidence have gained general acceptance in the scientific
community. 33  According to this test, expert testimony is inadmissible
Evi. 403.
131. See State v. Janes, 822 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Wash. App. 1992). See also State v. Walker, 700
P.2d 1168 (Wash. App. 1985), review denied, 104 Wash. 2d 1012 (Wash. 1985).
132. See supra text surrounding notes 82-83; Commonwealth v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1986).
"It has long been established that expert testimony is proper only where formation of an opinion on
a subject requires knowledge, information, or skill beyond what is possessed by the ordinary juror."
Id. at 921.
133. Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the court held that the results
of a polygraph test were inadmissible as expert evidence because the polygraph was not generally
accepted by the scientific community. I. at 1014. The court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
I.
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if based on principles considered experimental. 134  The Frye test,
however, has been criticized because it can exclude necessary evidence
based solely on its "scientific novelty."'13  The Frye test has also been
criticized on the grounds that many tenets of science, in particular
psychology and psychiatry, are subject to dispute among the various
members of the scientific community, thus making general acceptance
virtually impossible. 36  In addition, the Frye test distracts courts from
their primary duty to decide whether the contested evidence will aid the
trier of fact.
More than fifty years after Frye the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals advocated a new admissibility test derived in part from Federal
Rule of Evidence 702.131 Under the standard developed in Dyas v.
United States, 38 evidence is admissible if "the state of the pertinent art
or scientific knowledge [permits] a reasonable opinion to be asserted...
by an expert."'' 39  The court required the testimony to be distinctively
related to some science, profession, business, or occupation as to be
beyond the jury's understanding and the witness to be properly qualified
so as to aid the trier "in his search for truth."''  Because the behavioral
profile of abused children is beyond a jury's understanding, expert
testimony on the psychology of abused children would be admissible
under the Dyas test. Such evidence can be asserted by an expert to aid
the jury in its duty to deliver a just verdict.
134. Id. Under Pennsylvania law, expert testimony is admissible if it is relevant, satisfies the
Frye test, and if its contents are beyond the knowledge or experience of the average layperson.
Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 352 A.2d 30 (Pa. 1976).
135. M. Katherine Jenson, Comment, State v. Thomas: The Final Blow to Battered Women?.
43 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 503 (1982). Psychological evidence is less likely to mislead the jury compared
to the aura of credibility attached to items such as machinery and graphs. l at 506. A jury is more
prepared to evaluate psychological evidence because it involves human behavior that an average juror
can compare to his or her own life experience. Id.
136. McCord, supra note 127, at 83.
137. Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977). "If
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert ... may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EviD. 702. This rule confronts the other objections
to admissibility of expert testimony concerning the battered child syndrome. If the danger of
prejudice outweighs the probative value, the evidence will not assist the trier of fact. If the evidence
is not within the jury's common understanding, it will also not aid in the deliberation process.
138. 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977). cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977).
139. id. at 832 (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13 at 29-31 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed.
1972). See also McCord, supra note 30, at 86-90.
140. Dyas, 376 A.2d at 832 (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, 29-31 (Edward W. Cleary
ed., 2d ed. 1972)). This test has been used by courts to determine the admissibility of expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome. See Ibn-Tamas v. U.S., 407 A.2d 626, 632-33 (D.C.
1979); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
98 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1993
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expressly criticized the
Frye test in U.S. v. Downing 4' as seriously flawed, particularly as in
relation to the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. 42  The
Downing standard analyzes the scientific methodology used to generate
the evidence to determine if it can be accepted as reliable even if it has
not been widely accepted by the scientific community. 143  Information
on the behavioral characteristics displayed by abused children has been
obtained through interviewing and counseling victims of child abuse.'"
This method should not be considered unreliable, especially since the data
used to formulate the expert's opinion of the behavioral characteristics
displayed by abused children is usually obtained by the expert's personal
observations of the effects of child abuse.
45
Recently, the United States Supreme Court finally enunciated the
admissibility standard for expert scientific evidence in federal trials.46
The Court held that the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 47 which provides specific criteria for the
admission of expert testimony. 48 The Court maintained, however, that
the Rules do place limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence.' 49
The Court favored the use of cross-examination, the presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof over the
141. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
142. l at 1237.
143. Id.
144. Extensive research has been conducted on physically abused children, revealing that they
share common behavioral characteristics. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text; see also Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 841.
146. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 61 U.S.L.W. 4805 (1993). The case concerned
the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the potential for a certain prescription drug, Bendectin,
to cause birth defects. Id. The plaintiffs sought to introduce the conclusions of eight experts which
were based upon (1) test tube and animal studies that found a link between Bendectin and
malformations; (2) pharmacological studies of the chemical structure of Bendectin which tended to
show a similar structure to other substances known to cause birth defects; and (3) the "reanalysis"
of previously published human statistical studies. Id. at 4806. The District Court had granted
summary judgment for the defendant, holding that such testimony did not meet the "general
acceptance" standard of Frye, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
d
147. Id. at 4807. "Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes 'general acceptance' as an
absolute prerequisite to admissibility." Id. See also, Paul C. Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel
Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half Century Later, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 1197 (1980).
148. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of opinion or
otherwise." FED. R. EvD. 702.
149. Daubert, 61 U.S.L.W. at 4808. The trial judge must determine whether the expert will
testify about scientific knowledge that will aid the trier of fact. Id. See also FED. R. EviD. 104(a).
However, "the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is ... a flexible one." Daubert, 61 U.S.L.W. at 4809.
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"wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising 'general acceptance'
test.'"" Thus, the Court held that in federal trials, the "general
acceptance" standard of the Frye test can bear on the inquiry of
admissibility, but it is not the sole determinative factor."'
In light of the Daubert decision, expert testimony concerning the
battered child syndrome should be deemed admissible in Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania admits expert testimony if it aids the jury in understanding
a science, skill or occupation beyond the knowledge or experience of the
average layman. 52 This standard is satisfied by adherence to the Dyas,
Downing or Daubert tests. There should be no need to prove that the
expert testimony is generally accepted by the scientific community,
especially when, in the area of psychology, this is nearly impossible. 53
As long as the jury's function is not usurped, the testimony should be
admitted.
VII. Conclusion
The right of a battered child to present expert testimony on battered
child syndrome, including behavioral aspects attributed to victims of child
abuse, is increasingly becoming an issue in trials of children accused of
murdering their abusive parents. A heightened recognition of the plight
of abused children and the unequal treatment received by children in the
court system is convincing courts to reevaluate their handling of parricide
cases. These children should not be convicted of murder if they are
killing their abusers in self-defense.
Pennsylvania must reconsider its view on the admissibility of expert
testimony concerning the behavioral patterns exhibited by abused children
because this information is not part of a juror's common knowledge. For
the Pennsylvania courts to effectively administer justice, testimony on the
battered child syndrome should be admitted and the battered child
syndrome should be permitted as a theory of self-defense.
Catherine Erin Naughton
150. Daubert, 61 U.S.L.W. at 4810.
151. Id. at 4809. The court stated that "[wlidespread acceptance can be an important factor in
ruling particular evidence admissible." Id.
152. LEONARD PACKEL AND ANNE B. PouuLN, PENNSYLVANiA EVIDENCE § 702.1 (1987).
153. See supra note 136.

